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8/27/98

Date: 09/14/94
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

April 22, 1975

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CC 8 Aug 74
(this page only)

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill *MC*

Subject: MC CONE PAPERS

I have gone through most of the papers remaining at the Agency prepared by DCI McCone from November 29, 1961, through December 31, 1964. Attached are notes on portions of them dealing in any way with possible assassination attempts and contacts with the Warren Commission.

Enclosures

RMC:clb
(2)

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MATERIAL ATTACHED

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8 Aug 74
(pp 1-12 only)

MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS,
WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy -
"Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy -
"Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy -
Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412
Committee plus Robert Kennedy.

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project -
General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that
Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling
people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney
General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General -
included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor
operations apparently in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis
Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence,
General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion
of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's
are discovered in Cuba:

"McNamara expressed strong feelings
that we should take every possible aggressive
action in the fields of intelligence, sabo-
tage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans
and do such other things as might be indi-
cated to divide the Castro regime."
(emphasis added)

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File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

(97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy: McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]
[According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following:

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"I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]

File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963

Nothing Relevant

File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group" [MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about Kennedy assassination [MISSING]

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(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING]

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: "Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations.

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File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassination attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations.

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File: July 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering
through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press."
[MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI "reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

File: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.

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(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose. (Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

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File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action.

Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss "Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same notation appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to "explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)

*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

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The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba. Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

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BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"

Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House.

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BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassination of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "W" File

Nothing relevant.

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BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined.

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

April 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM

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To: File

From: Mason Cargill *MC*

Subject: MONGOOSE MATERIALS RETAINED BY THE CIA

8 Aug 74
(1)(c)
(2 pages only)

Joseph Selzer of the Inspector General staff made available to me all the materials he has been able to assemble from CIA sources concerning Project MONGOOSE. These consist of three file folders and one loose-leaf binder. I have examined them to determine if any reference is made to assassination, liquidation, or elimination of Castro.

The first document in this pile is a copy of the minutes of the August 10, 1962, meeting of the special group augmented, prepared by Tom Parrot. They were forwarded to Dr. Chamberlain, the CIA Inspector General, by Robroy Ratliff, a CIA employee detailed to the National Security Council. A cover memo of April 18, 1975, was attached, may be of some interest, and reads as follows:

"FYI, We received a request from Belin of the Vice President's Commission to examine our files on MONGOOSE and other Cuban and D.R. files. While this request has not been resolved, the preliminary response is not to allow this access. Signed Robroy Ratliff."

The minutes of the August 10, 1962, meeting contained no mention, implicit or explicit, of assassination.

The first complete file examined was a long green cardboard file without a title on it. Inside, however, it is indicated to be a record of Special Group meetings and

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Special Group (Augmented) meetings at which General Carter participated and discussions of Cuba and/or Cuban overflights during the period August 15 to November 14, 1962. This file contains a memorandum dated October 16, 1962, from General Carter to the Special Group Augmented, Subject: "Operation MONGOOSE Sabotage Proposals." Paragraph 1c of this memorandum contains a proposal that the CIA undertake ²⁴ (the Chinese Communist Embassy) grenade attack on the Chinese Communist Embassy in Havana, to be carried out by a recruited Cuban agent who has access to a roof overlooking the (embassy) garden and who has volunteered for this mission."

²⁴ The second file in this collection is entitled simply "MONGOOSE." This contains nothing relevant to the assassination inquiry.

Next in this collection in a large manila envelope on which is written in ink the following notation: "Separate cover attachment to ER75-5938." This envelope contains miscellaneous papers related to MONGOOSE. The documents in this envelope contain, among other things, a long list of potential sabotage targets within Cuba. I found no reference to assassination, either explicit or implicit.

The next file examined is marked "Cuba Special Subject." This file also contains miscellaneous papers relating to Project MONGOOSE, none of which contain any references to assassination.

The last item of this MONGOOSE package consists of a bulky loose-leaf binder of papers assembled for General Carter's reference of significant things that happened during the period of August to October, 1962. In this notebook, the Inspector General has already flagged entries which refer in any way to Operation MONGOOSE. I have examined all such entries.

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

April 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill *MC*

Subject: PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND QJWIN

On April 25, 1975, I was given three file folders containing material on the above subjects by Mr. Joseph Selzer of the Inspector General's staff. According to Mr. Selzer, his review of these files indicates that the basic purpose of ZRRIFLE and its asset QJWIN was the burglarization of premises outside the United States for the purpose of obtaining cryptologic materials. He assures me that there is nothing in these files which refer explicitly or implicitly to assassination or "executive action" in any form. His opinion is that clandestine operatives of the type who wrote the documents contained in these files would never commit to writing anything having to do with the subject of assassination.

The first file reviewed is entitled "ZRRIFLE/QJWIN/RYPAT OPERATIONAL." The following entries in this file seem to have some potential relevance:

- (12-10) 1. Dispatch, dated November 1, 1960, to Chief of Station, (Dakar), and Chief of Station, Luxembourg, from Chief, KUTUBE/D at headquarters. This three-page dispatch apparently deals with a mission on which a recruited agent, Jose Marie Andre Mankel, will be sent from Luxembourg, where he was recruited, to Dakar for the purpose of recruiting certain other agents from among criminal elements there, specifically Corsicans. The purpose for which these agents would ultimately be used is not clear from this dispatch. However, paragraph 2a reads as follows: "In view of the extreme sensitivity of the

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14p 12 Apr 99

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8 Aug 74

(1) (A) (12 pages)

objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do. Instead, he was told that we have evidence of Soviet operations among nationality groups in Africa, specifically, Corsicans, and that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use. (Comment: It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use MANKEL.) He agreed to go on the trip for us." It is not clear from this dispatch that Chiefs of Station in Luxembourg and (Dakar) were completely witting of the purpose for which Mankel is¹²⁻¹⁰ being sent to Dakar. Paragraph 3 contains the following sentence: "Rabney gave Jouvenoy [Chief of Station, Luxembourg] the same briefing¹²⁻¹⁰ concerning our purposes as he had given to the COS, (Dakar)." The remainder of the dispatch deals with details of the contacts with Americans which Mankel may make in Dakar if he requires further assistance, including instruction for bringing about a clandestine meeting.

2. Cable dated November 2, 1960, from (Frankfurt) to the Director with the notation: "Action: C/FI/D-4." This cable contains the following statement in paragraph 1: "Altman met Mankel 2 November. He accepted offer to proceed Leopoldville. Precise mission not conveyed to him, he only informed that mission might involve large element of personal risk."

*Leopoldville
may be
released
JR*

3. Cable, dated November²⁻¹⁰ 3, 1960, from Director to stations at Luxembourg and (Dakar). This cable contains the first identification of Mankel with the code name QJWIN. The cable reads as follows: "(AUDW) 147 on QJWIN trip Dakar pouched both stations 3 November. Confirm receipt by cable."

²⁰⁻²⁰"Luxembourg: will advise when to brief him on Dakar mission after receipt further info from Altman per paragraph to (FRAN) 6959/(IN36814) on Leopoldville mission." This cable contains the following code word references: RYBAT, LAURICLE, ZRACORN.

4. Cable from Leopoldville to Director, with action to C/FI/D4, dated 5 November 1960. It contains the following paragraph:

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- 3 -

"Please inform Mankel he should proceed Leopoldville as soon as shots completed. Not necessary have Congo visa. Should go Paris and take Air France flight to Brazzaville and can obtain visa for Brazzaville in Paris."

AIR FRANCE
Jean Le
released

This cable contains a handwritten note in the margin as follows: "One copy given to Mr. Bissell by IS/Duty Off. Saturday. Action to be taken by DDP. - E.B."

5. Cable, dated November 9, 1960, to Luxembourg from Director. It contains the following statement: "Unless yo advised to contrary by Altman, brief QJWIN on Dakar mission, using notes left during Rabney visit...Please insure he thoroughly rehearsed all details since we anticipate he will go from Leopoldville to Dakar with no opportunity reviewing briefing..."

6. Cable, November 11, 1960, to Director, from Luxembourg. Paragraph 2 contains the following statement: "QJWIN recommended two French contacts who agree undertake unspecified job. Arrangement made for direct access without QJWIN if Altman interested..."

7. Cable, dated November 12, 1960, to Director, from Leopoldville. This cable requests the immediate departure of QJWIN for Leopoldville, and contains the following statement: "Local operational circumstances require immediate expediting of QJWIN travel to Leopoldville."

8. The file contains several documents apparently describing various Italians in the area of Trieste who have the capability to break and enter and crack safes. They appeared to be of questionable morality. Reports on the safe-crackers were transmitted in a dispatch from the Chief of Station in (Rome) to the Chief, KUDOVE/D. The names of the 06 safecrackers in question are (Sabatti), (Cuccagna), and (Bernardini). 06

9. Cable, dated December 8, 1960, from Leopoldville to the Director. It indicates that one purpose of QJWIN's presence in Leopoldville is to recruit a major in the [Yugoslavian] air force, through framing him up in an illegal smuggling transaction. This recruitment is apparently for the purpose of collecting information from within the [Yugoslavian] government.

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10. Cable, dated December 14, 1960, from headquarters to Leopoldville. The cable criticizes Leopoldville for using QJWIN for the purpose of recruiting the "(Yugoslav) major, since this was not his primary purpose in Leopoldville." Cable contains the following statement: "Would like restrict QJWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Milan) for KUTUBE/D purposes. He our only asset of this type and we wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that originally planned for him." This is the first cable from headquarters on which the name of William K. Harvey appears.

11. Cable, dated December 17, 1960, from Leopoldville to Director. This cable concerned a new asset entering the picture for the first time, who arrived in Leopoldville on December 2. The cable states that WIROGUE was the asset with whom initial contact has been made in Leopoldville. WIROGUE is living in the same hotel as QJWIN with whom he conversed. QJWIN has reported: "WIROGUE had offered him \$300 per month to participate in intel net and be member execution squad. When QJWIN said he not interested, WIROGUE added there would be bonuses for special jobs. Under QJWIN questioning, WIROGUE later said he working for PBPRIME service."

12. Cable, dated January 19, 1961, from Director to Luxembourg. This cable apparently indicates that the Agency plans to use QJWIN in Leopoldville for more than one particular mission. It contained the following statement: "Inform QJWIN we planning use him Leopoldville indefinitely as discussed with him there."

13. There follows a series of cables reflecting the fact that QJWIN proceeds to Italy to recruit other assets. One cable admonishes field agents to tell QJWIN not to give reason to any of the candidates to be recruited in Italy to believe that ODYOKE or PBPRIME is involved. I get the impression that ODYOKE refers to the U.S. CIA, and PBPRIME refers to the intelligence service of some other nation. However, no document uncovered so far confirms this. Cables which follow seem to indicate that the people QJWIN was to recruit were intended to be professional burglars. There is no indication that they are intended to be assassins. There are many other indications that these recruits were intended for safecracking and breaking and entering. QJWIN told them he could offer a job for a large firm which wanted certain commercial documents stolen.

14. Subsequent cables and dispatches indicate other efforts on the part of QJWIN to recruit safecrackers in France and Italy.

15. Dispatch dated June 7, 1961, from headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D to the Chief of Station in Luxembourg. It contains a long discussion of the Agency's relationship with QJWIN and his main purpose as an agent. This dispatch makes it clear that the primary purpose of QJWIN's employment by the Agency is to recruit burglars and safecrackers for use by the CIA. This dispatch contains the first reference I have found to the code word ZRRIFLE. The one thing that seems rather unclear is why QJWIN was initially sent to Leopoldville, and apparently was contemplated to return to Leopoldville, when all of his recruiting of safecrackers and burglars takes place in Europe. The fact that his return to Leopoldville was contemplated may be easily seen from paragraph one of this cable. The releasing officer on this cable was Mr. William K. Harvey.

16. Correspondence and cables indicate that one James Rabney from CIA headquarters visited Europe in April and March of 1961 for the purpose of meeting with Mankel to discuss possible recruits for safecracking operations.

17. Dispatch dated December 15, 1961, from Chief of Station in Luxembourg to Headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D. It discusses the efforts of QJWIN to recruit two safecrackers in Switzerland. ^{o6}It indicates that two French citizens, named (Santelli) and (Garioni) were asked to come to Switzerland under false pretenses by QJWIN for the purpose of being interviewed. The following passage in the dispatch indicates clearly these men were to be recruited for the purpose of the safecracking and surreptitious entry. "During the interview with (Santelli), ^{o6}(Garioni) observed that for a night job he would need an assistant to help him with carrying the equipment and to act as lookout. He said he would prefer to do the job during working hours; for this he would get three or four others to help him and force someone in the office to open the safe."

18. Dispatch dated February 2, 1962, from Chief of Station Luxembourg to Headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D. It discusses the efforts of the Luxembourg station to provide acceptable cover for Mankel in Germany, where the Agency has

decided to locate him. The plan seems to be for Mankel to develop a business as an art dealer in some German town selling French paintings. It is contemplated that the Agency will supply the initial capital for the formation of his business. The final sentence in this dispatch asked headquarters for projected operational plans for QJWIN.

19. Cable, dated March 17, 1962, from Director to Luxembourg indicates that the Agency still contemplates some activity for Mankel in Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 of this cable reads as follows: "Tell him will at same time discuss Leopoldville assignment and have him sign contract." The cable directs Luxembourg to tell Mankel to meet James Rabney at certain locations in Germany on the 28th and 29th of March, 1961, telling him to be prepared to travel in Europe for about two weeks.

20. Cable dated April 18, 1962, from Headquarters to Luxembourg states that another agent (QJBANNER-5) had informed the Agency that QJWIN is going on trial after Easter on charges of cobalt smuggling from 1957 or 1958 and could receive up to a six-year sentence. Paragraph 2 of the cable states, "Please contact QJWIN for all details including specific charges and name prosecutor. If (QJBANNER-5) info true we may wish attempt quash charges or arrange somehow salvage QJWIN for our purposes." Paragraph 3 states, "Still do not have basic decisions but fully anticipate we will need QJWIN."

21. Cable, dated April 26, 1962, from Luxembourg to Headquarters indicates that QJWIN's trial will be completed on April 29. He expects to be fined but not subject to a jail sentence. Some indication of the Agency's intents with respect to QJWIN may be discerned from paragraph 4 which reads as follows: "While we do not know present long-term plans for QJWIN, he has no lead to other candidates. His potential appears restricted activation to candidates OLLA 1426 or personal spot action. Suggest either could be done from Leopold base and question if not preferable move him to Leopold assignment now." There is a handwritten notation beside the first sentence of paragraph 4 which states, "Not the point." Beside the last sentence of this paragraph is the handwritten notation, "How?"

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22. Cable dated May 24, 1962, to Luxembourg from Headquarters indicates that the Agency has changed its plans about assigning QJWIN any duties in Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 reads, "Decision made keep QJWIN Europe. Leopoldville assignment canceled." Cable also indicates that headquarters approves of Mankel's proposed move to Germany, probably Baden-Baden.

23. Memorandum dated July 3, 1962, WKH [presumably William K. Harvey] from AMS, re ZRRIFLE. This memo discusses possible future uses for QJWIN. It seems perfectly consistent with the use of QJWIN merely for the purpose of recruiting safecrackers and burglars. Paragraph 4 of this memo refers to some ZRRIFLE authorization paper: "I have already given you the ZRRIFLE authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has been given QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1 March 1963." An attachment to this memorandum gives details on two possible candidates for burglary and safecracking. In this attachment there are two references, however, which may be somewhat disturbing: One candidate is stated to be "willing to use gun"; the second "wanted to know if he should be armed for job--ready to go to the end."

24. Immediately following a dispatch dated December 7, 1962, from Luxembourg to headquarters, there appears in the files two pages of penciled notes on yellow "buck-slip" type paper which are difficult to read but may be relevant. At the top of the first page appears the word QJWIN. On this page appears the following words, which are barely legible: "In 1961 by Bill H or Bissell used (Arnold Estate) [or (Estate)] direct action capability established in B [illegible] QJWIN Luxembourg principal prelim capability for fourth country. QJWIN spotted three or four--moved to Italy..."

25. Dispatch from Luxembourg to Headquarters Chief, KUTUBE, dated February 14, 1964, indicates that QJWIN has been terminated. Paragraph 1 reads in part, "QJWIN has been terminated. Rozeney told him on 21 April that the operation in which he was to play a role had been shelved and therefore his contract, which ran out on 29 February, was not renewed. He was reassured that this action did not result from anything he had done and his past cooperation was appreciated. It was mentioned as conceivable that the operation might have been off and running if he had been able to establish his cover last year."

Another file examined was entitled "ZRRIFLE Administrative/Financial"; it is a long manila-type file. The following items of possible interest were noted in this file:

1. Memorandum dated January 11, 1961, to the Finance Division from William K. Harvey, Chief FI/D deals with the payments for Mankel's trip to Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 of this memo states, "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be noted that QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed. Although future use of QJWIN is not precluded, it was not deemed fitting during this one use of him to enter into a continuing contractual relationship or to have him sign any memorandum of understanding."

2. Memorandum, dated January 31, 1961, for Chief, Accounts Branch, Finance Division, from Justin E. O'Donnell, Subject: Payments to QJWIN. Paragraph 1 of this memorandum reads as follows: "QJWIN was recruited in Frankfurt 1 November 1960 to undertake a one-shot mission to the Belgian Congo. Because the mission potentially involved great personal risk to him and he was obliged to separate himself from his business affairs, it was agreed orally by this writer with QJWIN that his compensation would be at the rate of \$1,000 per month, plus his expenses, for a period of not less than one month and not more than two months." These two financial memoranda, numbers 1 and 2 here, seem to indicate a one-shot purpose for QJWIN in connection with a Congo operation, which seems inconsistent with many of the papers in the operational file reviewed above, which indicated an ongoing relationship with QJWIN for the purposes of recruiting safecrackers and burglars. These financial memoranda are certainly quite consistent with a plan to use QJWIN for a one-shot assassination attempt in the Belgian Congo. It is unclear that merely recruiting safecrackers and burglars or even performing safecracking and burglary missions, would have involved "potential great personal risk" to QJWIN.

3. Memorandum, dated March 24, 1961, for Cable Secretariat from William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division D, Subject: "Distribution of ZRRIFLE Traffic." Paragraph 1 of this memorandum reads, "Two copies of all cables bearing the ZRRIFLE indicator are to be delivered in a sealed envelope

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directly to Chief, FI/Division D, 1502 L Building. No other distribution is to be made without the specific approval in each instance of the Chief, FI/D." Paragraph 2 reads, "The above has been personally approved by the Deputy Director (Plans)." I question whether such close handling of cable traffic is not unusual even in a case involving safecracking and burglary. Perhaps Harvey intended traffic of more sensitive issues to be passed through the ZRRIFLE channel.

4. In a large manila envelope filed immediately after a dispatch to Luxembourg from the Chief, KUTUBE, dated September 30, 1963, is a large manila envelope marked "Documents in Receipt Supporting ZRRIFLE Activities." Within this envelope are several smaller manila envelopes, one of which is entitled "ZRRIFLE, Receipts for Accounting Submitted by WK Harvey, Receipt for Operational Phone Calls May 15, 1963." Within this envelope are two sheets of yellow legal size paper which contain lists of operational expenses submitted by W.K. Harvey covering the period April 13-21, 1963, all of which are to be charged as operational expenses to QJWIN/ZRRIFLE. These expenses cover hotel expenses in Miami and Perine, Florida, long distance hotel calls for these locations, plus \$75 for a boat chartered for operational purposes at Islamorada, Florida. A hotel receipt indicates Harvey paid the bill of a Mr. John A. Wallston of 56510 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, for the nights of April 17, 18, and 19, and a Miami hotel, probably the Eden Roc. These documents are the first indication of any activities within the U.S. with respect to ZRRIFLE. Apparently they did not involve QJWIN but rather other activity, perhaps directed at Cuba because of his location in Miami. Perhaps Harvey should be confronted with this listing and asked to explain it.

A third file was examined, which was marked "ZRRIFLE-QJWIN Project/Contract. The following items of interest were found:

1. A long memorandum written in ink in longhand on sheets of yellow, legal size paper at the very back of this file entitled "Project ZRRIFLE." This is apparently justification material submitted for the project. The first portion of this memorandum seems to end abruptly at the end of the second page;

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perhaps the subsequent pages are missing. These first two pages portray the objective of ZRRIFLE to be that of procurement of code and cipher materials by burglary and safe-cracking. However, subsequent pages, particularly the last four legal size pages in this file, contain what appears to be the outline of something which could be the establishment of an "executive action capability," although these words are not mentioned nor is the word "assassination." A copy of these pages should definitely be obtained. Paragraph 1 of these pages reads as follows, "Legal, ethical, moral, operational problems; political nonattributability." Paragraph 2 reads in part: "Our own experience (Bangkok) (and affect on DDP) and experiences with KGB...require most professional, proven operationally competent ruthless stable CE experience ops officers..."

Paragraph 3 of this memo is entitled "Maximum Security"; subparagraph 3b reads: "Within KUBARK one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" Paragraph 3c reads as follows: "Max. security cable COMMO for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one man overseas (Europe) control base with own (nonstation) COMMO. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips." Paragraph 3f reads as follows, "No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. government agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal." Paragraph 3i reads, "Pretext: KUTUBE/D search; this established (e.g., Rome)." Paragraph 3j reads, "No discussion in stations." Paragraph 3k reads, "No 'team' until ready to go, if at all." Paragraph 4 reads: "Blackmail: A. No American citizens or residents or people whoever obtained U.S. visas. B. No chain of connections: Strictly person to person; singleton ops. C. No meeting any candidate in home territory. D. Exclude organizations; e.g., Sicilians, criminals, those with record of arrest, those with instability of purpose as criminals. E. Staffers involved--selection." Paragraph 5 reads, "Cover: Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets or Czechs in case of blow." [This seems to indicate ZRRIFLE is not limited to burglary of embassies; how could you blame the Soviets or the Czechs for burglarizing their own embassies?] Paragraph 9 reads, "Should have phoney 201 in records to backstop this [referring to blaming the Soviets or the Czechs], all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file." Paragraph 11 reads, "Silverthorne."

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On the following page of these papers, the paragraphs are numbered again from one. On this page a large ink X has been placed over the page; however, it is still legible. Paragraph 1 of this page reads, "Maximum security plus within KUBARK only (e.g., How much does Sivagusa[?] now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering and deciphering. Guise of LAURICLE objective." Paragraph 5 reads, "No chain of connections permitting blackmail."

2. Memorandum, dated February 19, 1962, from Richard Helms, Deputy Director (Plans), to William K. Harvey, Subject: "Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities." This memorandum authorizes Harvey to retain the services of agent QJWIN "and such other principal agents and subagents as may be required." Memorandum does not state the purpose of the ZRRIFLE project.

3. Filed immediately after a memorandum dated March 6, 1969, from Richard Helms to William K. Harvey, is a normal business size white envelope containing the following notation on the front in penciled handwriting, "Lloyd very personal from Bill H." Within this envelope is a small yellow piece of paper containing the following notation in penciled handwriting, "John Rosselli, alias John Ralston--Wm. Walker."

4. A memorandum dated June 27, 1963, for Chief, Foreign Intelligence, from William K. Harvey, Subject: QJWIN. This memo states that QJWIN is currently not being used for any operational purposes. It discusses whether or not he should be retained as an agent. Paragraph 2 seems to indicate that the executive action portion of QJWIN's project, if any, has been terminated. This paragraph reads: "As far as the ZRRIFLE aspects of this operation which has been covered under the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which Fletcher M. Knight is fully familiar as I orally advised you on June 26, 1963, except for one precautionary 'lifeline,' aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer, except perhaps for minor accountings, be considered as a part of this project."

A last file of the ZRRIFLE series examined is entitled "ZRRIFLE Name Traces/Personality Sketches." Items of interest in this file are as follows:

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1. Piece of thin white paper under tab C, the heading of which is "Secret-RYBAT." This document is a list of traits which desired recruits would have. This is similar to the list of traits deemed desirable in the handwritten memorandum contained in the far rear of the previous file reviewed. This set of characteristics, however, could refer to burglars and safecrackers as well as assassins. This is indicated by paragraph 8 which reads, "Commercial firms (unspecified)-- industrial documents cover."

2. Included under tab M is a dossier of one (Harold Meltzer) a resident of Los Angeles, with a long criminal record. This is the first instance in which I have noted a U.S. citizen under consideration for any recruitment with respect to the ZRRIFLE project.

3. Under tab T, information on (Orlando Portale), an Italian citizen residing in Detroit, is included.

4. At tab Y is a page of information on one (Hanna Yazbeck). The report states, "He often heads up a hatchet squad when disputes arise between the Moslem and Christian underworld factions in Beirut." The second paragraph of this page reads as follows: "During the period I was in Europe (1950-1958), his chief bodyguard was a convicted murderer who owed his release from prison to (Yazbeck's) power. This bodyguard has since been murdered, but (Yazbeck) has an available pool of assassins."

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